MARINE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

July 9, 2015

Adopted by the Japan Transport Safety Board

Member Kuniaki Shoji Member Satoshi Kosuda Member Mina Nemoto

ACCIDENT TYPE	Grounding			
DATE AND TIME	Around 22:08, July 14, 2014(local time, UTC-7 hours)			
LOCATION	Offshore southwest of Prince Rupert Port in British Columbia, Canada			
	Vicinity of 166° true bearing, 0.7 nautical miles (M) from Gull Rocks			
	Lighthouse			
	(approximately 54°07.30'N, 130°31.04'W)			
PROCESS AND	On July 23, 2014, an investigator-in-charge from the Yokohama			
PROGRESS OF THE	office and one other investigator were appointed to investigate this			
INVESTIGATION	accident.			
	Opinions on the draft report were invited from parties relevant to			
	the cause of the accident.			
	Comments on the draft report were invited from substantially			
	interested state.			
FACTUAL INFORMATION				
VESSEL TYPE AND	Cargo ship AMAKUSA ISLAND, 44,547 tons			
NAME, GROSS	141294 (IMO Number 9303900), IINO KAIUN KAISHA, LTD./KYUDEN			
TONNAGE	SANGYO CO., INC. (ship owner), IINO MARINE SERVICE CO., LTD.			
VESSEL NUMBER AND	(ship management company)			
OWNER	228.00m x 36.50m x 19.13m, Steel			
LxBxD AND HULL	Diesel Engine, 9,966kW, August 20, 2005			
MATERIAL				
ENGINE,OUTPUT,				
DATE OF LAUNCH				
CREW INFORMATION	Master (Nationality: Republic of the Philippines), Male, 51 years old			
	Endorsement attesting the recognition of certificate under STCW			
	regulation I/10 Master (issued by Japan)			
	Date of Issue: May 15, 2014			
	(Valid until May 14, 2019)			
	Pilot (Unidentified), Male, age indeterminate			
	Pilot License: Unknown			
INJURIES TO PERSON	None			
DAMAGE TO VESSEL	Ruptures on the starboard bottom shell plating of the forepeak tank			
	and the bottom shell plating of starboard ballast tanks No. 1 and No. 2			

EVENTS LEADING TO This vessel with a crew of 20 people, including the master (all THE ACCIDENT members from the Republic of the Philippines), and also the pilot onboard and loaded with 80,021 tons of coal, with its fore and aft at approximately 13.33m of draft, left the pier at the Ridley coal terminal for Anchorage No. 25 at Prince Rupert Port at about 20:45 (local time) on July 14, 2014. Upon receiving the instruction to stand by at the anchorage from the operation company before leaving the pier, the master discussed the passage plan to the anchorage with the pilot on the bridge. After passing the water area offshore north of Greentop Island, this vessel proceeded directly toward the anchorage. At the location approximately 3.5M from the anchorage, the main engine was set to dead slow ahead and the vessel proceeded southwest at about 6.0 knots (kn) speed over the ground. Then, at about 22:08 the bow ran aground on a shoal. The master received a report from the chief officer on the fore that he felt vibration. Since the vessel was unable to hold headway, the pilot instructed to stop the main engine. Examination of British Admiralty Nautical Chart 4936 (Prince Rupert Port) revealed that the vessel had run aground at a depth of 10.7m. The master ordered the crew member to measure the depths of the ballast tanks, and discovered that water had entered the forepeak tank and starboard ballast tanks No. 1 and No. 2. The master reported the accident to the ship management company. The pilot reported the accident to the Canadian Coast Guard. At about 02:25 on the 15th, this vessel was able to refloat on its own by the engine astern. At approximately 04:15, the vessel anchored at a different anchorage. After temporary repair, this vessel left for Japan at about 09:20 on September 9. (Refer to Attached figure 1: Presumed cruise course, Appendix 1: VDR position information (excerpt)) WEATHER AND SEA Weather: Cloudy, Wind direction: West, Wind Force: 2, Visibility: Good CONDITIONS Sea condition: Low tide, Sea State: 2 OTHER MATTERS This vessel was equipped with two radars but with no electronic chart display and information system (ECDIS). In this vessel, the master, third officer, and helmsman in addition to the pilot were assigned at the bridge. The pilot showed the master the passage plan indicating a direct route from Greentop Island to Anchorage No. 25, and the master

confirmed the nautical chart together with the pilot, but the master did not notice the shallow water area.

The master and pilot thought that the water depth at the site of the accident was indicated as 107m on the nautical chart.

After leaving the pier, the master recorded the course line on the nautical chart according to the navigation plan presented by the pilot, and explained the course to the third officer.

The master of this vessel became a ship captain in about May 2007 and boarded this vessel on May 2014.

Pilot notes that it was very unusual laden ship to be sent to anchorage instead of departing from the port.

The safety management system of the ship management company stipulate the following:

The pilotage passage plan will need to be discussed with the pilot as soon as he comes on board. Any amendments to the plan should be agreed and recorded, and any consequential charges in individual bridge team responsibilities made, before pilotage commences.

ANALYSIS

INVOLVEMENT OF
CREW AND OTHERS
INVOLVEMENT OF
HULL/ENGINE, etc.
INVOLVEMENT OF
WEATHER/SEA
CONDITIONS, etc

ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS

Yes

None

None

It is considered probable that, since the master of this vessel planned the route from the pier at the Ridley coal terminal to the anchorage at Prince Rupert Port via the shallow water area offshore southwest of Prince Rupert Port, the vessel proceeded toward the shallow water area and ran aground.

It is considered somewhat likely that, when the master of this vessel checked the nautical chart by referring to the navigation plan presented by the pilot, the master mistakenly recognized the water depth of 10.7m as 107m.

PROBABLE CAUSES


It is considered probable that, because the master of this vessel planned the course to pass the shallow water area offshore southwest of Prince Rupert Port after leaving the pier at the Ridley coal terminal toward the anchorage at Prince Rupert Port, the vessel proceeded toward the shallow water area and ran aground, resulting in this accident.

ACTIONS TAKEN

After the occurrence of this accident, the ship management company announced the information of this accident to disseminate it to all ships under its management.

It is considered probable that the following items can be useful for preventing recurrence of the same type of accidents, etc. in the future.

- Pilot must exchange information thoroughly with the crew of the ship to pilot.
- Master and officer must closely examine the navigation plan presented by the pilot.



Appendix 1 VDR position information (excerpt)

Time (Hours: Minutes: Seconds)	North Latitude(N) (° -')	West Longitude(W)	Heading (°)	STW (kn)
20:54:59	54-13. 590	130-20. 355	203. 3	1. 1
20:59:59	54-13. 454	130-20. 478	199. 3	2. 4
21:09:56	54-12. 572	130-20. 871	192. 1	5. 9
21:19:56	54-11. 609	130-22. 152	260. 0	7. 1
21:29:59	54-11. 260	130-24. 742	250. 3	8. 6
21:40:00	54-10. 223	130-26. 689	214. 8	8. 9
21:49:59	54-08. 987	130-28. 327	214. 8	8. 2
21:54:59	54-08. 438	130-29. 096	224. 8	7. 6
22:00:00	54-07. 973	130-29. 885	224. 7	6. 5
22:04:59	54-07. 572	130-30. 570	226. 6	5. 7
22:05:59	54-07. 501	130-30. 698	226. 7	5. 4
22:06:58	54-07. 428	130-30. 827	226. 7	5. 4
22:08:00	54-07. 359	130-30. 947	226. 7	5. 4
22:08:59	54-07. 303	130-31. 043	228. 5	0. 7
22:09:58	54-07. 302	130-31. 043	229. 9	-0. 1

(Note) The vessel position refers to the position of the GPS antenna mounted at the upper part of the bridge.