AI2018-7

AIRCRAFT SERIOUS INCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

TAKUMI ENTERPRISE HELICOPTER & AIRPLANE CO., LTD. JA7981

November 29, 2018



JTSB Japan Transport Safety Board

The objective of the investigation conducted by the Japan Transport Safety Board in accordance with the Act for Establishment of the Japan Transport Safety Board and with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation is to prevent future accidents and incidents. It is not the purpose of the investigation to apportion blame or liability.

Kazuhiro Nakahashi Chairman Japan Transport Safety Board

AIRCRAFT SERIOUS INCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

SHORTAGE OF FUEL REQUIRING URGENT MEASURES AT AN ALTITUDE OF ABOUT 5,300 FT OVER THE AREA 28 KM NORTHEAST OF OTSU CITY SHIGA PREFECTURE, JAPAN AT AROUND 17:05 JST, AUGUST 27, 2017

TAKUMI ENTERPRISE HELICOPTER & AIRPLANE CO., LTD. ROBINSON R44(ROTORCRAFT), JA7981

October 26, 2018 Adopted by the Japan Transport Safety Board Chairman Kazuhiro Nakahashi Member Toru Miyashita Member Toshiyuki Ishikawa Member Yuichi Marui Member Keiji Tanaka Member Miwa Nakanishi

1. PROCESS AND PROGRESS OF THE INVESTIGATION

1.1 Summary of	On Sunday, August 27, 2017, at around 17:05 Japan Standard Time
the Serious	(JST: UTC + 9hrs, unless otherwise stated all times are indicated in JST on a
Incident	24-hour clock), a Robinson R44, registered JA7981, operated by Takumi
	Enterprise Helicopter & Airplane Co., Ltd. made an emergency landing at the
	ground of a school in Fushimi Ward, Kyoto City, as the "LOW FUEL" warning
	light came on while flying at about 5,300 ft over the area 28 km northeast of
	Otsu City, Shiga Prefecture.
	Only a pilot was on board. There were no casualties.
1.2 Outline of the	The occurrence covered by this report falls under the category of
Serious	"Shortage of fuel requiring urgent measures" as stipulated in Clause 12,
Incident	Article 166-4 of the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Civil Aeronautics Act,
Investigation	and is classified as a serious incident.
	On August 28, 2017, the Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB)
	designated an investigator-in-charge and an investigator to investigate this
	serious incident.
	Although this serious incident was notified to the United States of
	America, as the State of Design and Manufacture of the Rotorcraft involved
	in this serious incident, the United State did not designate its accredited
	representative.

Comments on the draft report were invited from parties relevant to the
cause of the serious incident and the Relevant State.

2. FACTUAL INFORMATION

2.1 History of the According to the statements of the pilot and persons concerned with the Flight serious incident as well as portable GPS receiver records, the history of the flight is summarized as below. A Robinson R44, registered JA7981 (hereinafter referred to as "the helicopter"), operated by Takumi Enterprise Helicopter & Airplane Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "the Company"), took off from JPD Kyoto temporary helipad (hereinafter referred to as "the JPD Kyoto") in Fushimi Ward, Kyoto City at around 08:12, August 26, 2017 in order to participate in an event held in Oyabe city, Toyama Prefecture, with a pilot on board and about 135 liters of fuel onboard. After landing at Oyabe temporary helipad (hereinafter referred to as "the Oyabe Helipad"), the event site, at around 09:36, the helicopter performed a flight to support parachute descent and a demonstration flight for 12 minutes, respectively. Afterwards, while the helicopter moved to Uchiondo temporary helipad (hereinafter referred to as "the Uchiondo Helipad") in Oyabe City, Toyama Prefecture for refueling service, the "LOW FUEL" warning light came on in a moment before its landing. After landing, a refueler supplied 100 liters of fuel into its main tank. The pilot confirmed the fuel gage needle was moved toward fuel increasing but did not read the remaining fuel quantity accurately on the gage. Besides, he did not open the fuel caps to check visually after refueling. The helicopter took off from the Uchiondo Helipad, returned to the Oyabe Helipad and parked there. In the morning on August 27, the next day, the helicopter performed a flight to support parachute descent and a sightseeing flight for 12 minutes, respectively, but it was not refueled after that. After the event was over, the pilot made a flight plan to the JPD Kyoto

After the event was over, the pilot made a flight plan to the JPD Kyoto calculating minimum required quantity of onboard fuel as 110 liters by estimating the total flight distance as 120 nm and one hour and 50 minutes of airborne time (= one hour and 20 minutes of elapsed time + 10 minutes of delay correction + 20 minutes of reserve fuel). During preflight checks, the pilot checked the fuel gage and thought that the quantity of fuel onboard was enough to reach the destination. Afterwards, he informed the Civil Aviation Bureau via the headquarters that in his flight plan, the helicopter would take off from the Oyabe Helipad at 16:00 and land at the JPD Kyoto at 17:30 with 110 liters of fuel onboard.

The helicopter took off from the Oyabe Helipad at 16:04 and flew straight to Kyoto via over Takashima, Lake Biwa. The pilot set at 24.00 inHg output power at the time of take-off to have the helicopter climb gradually maintaining constantly the maximum continuous power that would not exceed the range between 22.0 and 22.5 inHg. He did not estimate accurately the effect of wind for his calculation but he assumed there would be tailwind when the helicopter climbed, and he went up to 8,500 ft so that the ground

speed on GPS receiver was able	III 土地理院
to exceed the indicated airspeed.	<u>4</u>
When he made a position report	
at 16:48, he looked at the fuel	/
gage but did not read the	Fu
indication accurately. The pilot	
noticed the consumed fuel	/ (
amount was larger than usual	
while flying around over the	American and
north end of Lake Biwa and	Takash
thought about changing the	TAL mit
destination to Fukui Airport,	PAR
but eventually decided to fly	The JPD Kyoto
toward the JPD Kyoto as	Ceospatial Information A
planned because its distance	Figure 1: Estir
was closer by 10 nm.	8
The LOW FUEL warning lig	ht started to c
around 17:00 and it completely cam	ie on at around
southwest of Lake Biwa. The indic	ator on the GI
estimated time of arrival at the JPI) Kyoto was are
the flight manual, if the helicopter	continues flyir
would run out in about 10 minutes	after the LOW
on, which meant being short of 3 r	ninutes to land
judged it would be difficult for	the helicopter
destination without any changes. Th	ne pilot decided



Figure 1: Estimated flight route of JA7981

	The LOW FUEL warning light started to come on occasionally from a
	around $17:00$ and it completely came on at around $17:05$ over the area around
	southwest of Lake Biwa. The indicator on the GPS receiver showed that th
	estimated time of arrival at the JPD Kyoto was around 17:18; and according t
	the flight manual, if the helicopter continues flying at a cruise power, its fue
	would run out in about 10 minutes after the LOW FUEL warning light come
	on, which meant being short of 3 minutes to land safely; therefore, the pilo
	judged it would be difficult for the helicopter to continue flying to th
	destination without any changes. The pilot decided to land at the empty ground
	after informing the JPD Kyoto that the pilot would make a precautionar
	landing and looking for an appropriate landing site. The pilot confirmed th
	ground safety over the target site, made a landing at the ground at around
	17:16, and stopped the engine after cooling. After that, a mechanic of th
	Company refueled about 58 liters of fuel with a hand pump at the ground; th
	helicopter took off from the ground at 06:11 on the next morning, and lande
	at 06:17 at the JPD Kyoto located in around 7 km southwest of the ground.
	This serious incident occurred at around 17:05 on August 27, 2017, a
	an altitude of about 5,300 ft over the area 28 km northeast of Otsu City, Shig
	Prefecture (35° 15' 01" N, 135° 57' 59" E).
2.2 Injuries to	None
Persons	
2.3 Damage to	None
Aircraft	
2.4 Personnel	(1) Captain Male, Age 33
Information	Commercial pilot certificate (Rotorcraft) August 29, 2011
	Pilot competence assessment Expiry of practicable period for flight

1	1 0	1	1	0
				May 24, 2019
Type of rating for single	-piston engi	ne (land)		August 29, 2011
Class 1 aviation medical c	ertificate	Valie	dity date:	October 17, 2017

	Total flight time				682 hours and 34 minutes		
	Flight time on the same type of aircraft			:	355 hours an	d 46 minutes	
	Flight time in the last 30 days				2 hours ar	nd48 minutes	
2.5 Aircraft	(1) Type)					Robinson R44
Information	Seria	al number					1011
	Date	e of manufact	ure			I	March 1, 2001
	Cert	ificate of Air	worthiness				No.To-28-388
	Valie	dity date				Noven	nber 27, 2017
	Tota	l flight time			1,	402 hours an	d 24 minutes
	(2) Whe	en the seriou	us incident o	occurred,	the weigl	nt and the b	alance of the
	helicopt	ter were both	within the a	allowable	range.		
2.6 Meteorological	Ae	eronautical	weather obs	ervations	around	the time of	f the serious
Information	inciden	t at Fukui Ai	rport, which	is close to	the fligh	t route, were	as follows:
	16:0	0					
	Wine	d direction 38	50°; Wind vel	locity 9 kt	Visibilit	y 10 km or m	ore
	Pres	ent weather	phenomena:	Cloudy			
	Clou	id Amount: 2	/8 to 3/8, Typ	e: unknow	vn, Cloud	base: 5,000 f	ft
		Amount: 4/8 to 6/8, Type: unknown, Cloud base: unknown					
	Tem	Temperature 28°C; Dew point 22°C					
	Altin	Altimeter setting (QNH) 29.94 inHg					
	The wind direction, wind velocity and outside air temperature along the				ture along the		
	flight ro	oute were as	follows:	T	r	ſ	1
	Time	Location	Observation	Wind	Wind	Outside air	Sources
			altitude	direction	velocity	temperature	
			(ft)	(degree)	(kt)		
	16:30	Fukui	6,000	190	10		Wind
			5,000	160	15	-	profiler
			3,500	160	10		
	16:30	Katsuyama	643	315	5	28	Local
	17:00	Imazu	289	070	3	29	meteorological
	17:20	Kyoto	135	090	8	32	observatories
	Ta	able 1: Wind	direction, wi	nd velocity	y and out	side air temp	perature
	along the flight route of JA7981						

2.7 Additional	(1) GPS receiver records
Information	A portable GPS receiver
	brought in the helicopter had
	recorded the flight data from the
	time when the helicopter took off
	from the JPD Kyoto on one day
	before to the serious incident
	occurrence till when it landed at
	the ground. Figure 1 shows the
	helicopter's estimated flight
	route from taking off from the Photo 1: Instrument panel of JA7981
	Oyabe Helipad to landing at the
	ground.
	(2) Fuel system of Robinson R44
	a. Fuel tank capacity (110.0 km)
	Main fuel tank capacity $29.5 \text{ gal (US) (112.0 liters)}$
	Auxiliary fuel tank capacity $17.0 \text{ gal (US)} (-54.0 \text{ liters})$
	Unusable fuel quantity 1.5 gal (US) (5.6 liters)
	tark is located higher than the main fuel tark, therefore it will become
	ampty first
	h Fuel gages
	The fuel gages that show the quantity by fractions are mounted
	below the instrument panel and electrically operated by float-type
	transmitters in the fuel tanks.
	c. LOW FUEL warning light
	The "LOW FUEL warning light" on the instrument panel is operated
	by a separate electric sender located on the bottom of the main tank.
	According to the flight manual, an illuminated low fuel warning light
	indicates that the usable remaining fuel quantity is about 3 gallons (US)
	(11.3 liters) and the fuel will run out within about 10 minutes if the
	helicopter continues flying at a cruise power; and it is also noted as follows:
	Caution
	the quantity of remaining fuel
	the quantity of remaining fuel.
	d. Safety Notices ¹
	In addition, as the appendices of the flight manual for Robinson 44,
	attached are safety notices that describe the measures to prevent accidents
	resulting from fuel exhaustion as follows:
	Safety Notice $SN-15$ (excerpts)
	FUEL EXHAUSTION CAN BE FATAL

 $^{^1\,}$ The "Safety Notice" refers to safety information issued by Robinson on the bases of various accidents and incidents in the past so that pilots can study mistakes made by other pilots to avoid making the same errors.

1) Novar roly solo	ly on the fuel gage or the low fuel warning light (I OW			
FUEL warnin questionable re hourmeter ² rea 2) During your pr a) Check the fue	ng light). These electromechanical devices have liability in any airplane or helicopter. Always record the ending each time the fuel tanks are filled. eflight: el level in the tanks visually.			
b) Be sure the fi	iel caps are tight.			
c) Drain a smal check for water	l quantity of fuel from each tank and the gascolator to or other contamination.			
3) Before takeoff:				
a) Insure that the	he fuel valve is full on.			
b) Be sure guard	l is placed on mixture control.			
c) Plan your ne remaining.	xt fuel stop so you will have at least 20 minutes of fuel			
4) In flight:				
a)Continually o low fuel, LAN	check both hourmeter and fuel gages. If either indicates ND.			
b) Always land 1/4 full.	to refuel before the main tank fuel gage reads less than			
c) NEVER allow	w the fuel quantity to become so low in flight that the			
low fuel war	ning light comes on.			
(3) The required quant services	ity of fuel onboard applied to the Company's aerial work			
a. Onboard fu following matter (i) Weather fo	el shall be calculated taking into consideration the rs, and the amount of fuel shown in b. shall be loaded. precast			
(ii) Expected a	elay in air traffic control			
(iii) Other sit	uations that lead to a delay in landing of aircraft or an			
increase of	fuel consumption			
b. Onboard fuel				
	Aerial work services			
Rotorcraft	1. The amount of fuel required for flight from			
(Helicopter)	departure to destination			
	2. Reserve fuel of 10 minutes (Cruise)			
(4) Calculation of elap	sed time and minimum amount of fuel stipulated in the			
Company's Robinson I	R 44 Series Aircraft Operation Manual (Excerpt)			
As this flight was	s not air transport services but a company flight, though			
it was part of aerial	work services, this report describes the followings as			
reference for the calculation of onboard fuel.(*added as reference values.)				
(I) Fuel consumption rate shall be 16 gallons per one hour (* about 60.6				
liters).				

 $^{^2\,}$ The "hour meter" refers to an integrated indicator which detects the engine power change (the collective pitch lever position) and keeps track of the flight time.

(II)	Starting engine and run-up
	It shall be the consumed fuel amount (*about 5 liters) for
	starting engine and run-up (for 5 minutes).
(III)	<i>Tour distance</i>
	According to the limitations stated in the Section 2 of the
	manual as well as wind condition on the flight date, the elapsed
	time required for flying tour distance in a cruising status shall be
	calculated.
a.	Climb compensation
	The correction for speed decrease due to the climb to the cruising
	altitude shall be 2 minutes per 1,000 ft climb.
b.	Cruise
	It shall be flight time from departure point to destination
(IV)	Delay compensation
	The time delay in the course of flight shall be calculated to be
	10 % of elapsed time.
(V)	Reserve fuel
	It shall be the amount of fuel that can be flown for 20 minutes at
	the speed capable of flying the longest distance, plus amount of
	fuel ³ that is stipulated and notified by the Minister of Land,
	Infrastructure taking into consideration unforeseen situations.
(5) Measur	ring results of the quantity of remaining fuel collected from the
helicopter	and the quantity of remaining fuel at the time of the LOW FUEL
warning lig	ght ON
After	the flight from the ground to the JPD Kyoto, the remaining fuel in
the helicop	oter's fuel system was collected from drain holes located on the
bottom of t	the tanks, the quantity of the collected remaining fuel and that of
remaining	fuel at the time of the LOW FUEL warning light ON were measured
respectivel	y as follows:
Ren	naining fuel collected from the :61.5 liters
heli	copter
Ren	naining fuel at the time of the LOW \div 18.6 liters (measured
FU	EL warning light ON in a grounding attitude)

3. ANALYSIS

3.1 Involvement	Yes
of Weather	
3.2 Involvement	Yes
of Pilot	
3.3 Involvement	None
of Aircraft	
3.4 Analysis of	(1) Estimated remaining fuel quantity at the time of the LOW FUEL warning

 $^{^3}$ Regarding the VFR flight by aircraft not providing the aerial work services, the amount of fuel is not stipulated in this notification as with this flight by the helicopter.

Findings	light ON			
	Judging from the remaining fuel quantity measured in the investigation,			
	the remaining fuel quantity at the time of landing at the ground is estimated			
	as follows:			
	The quantity of remaining fuel collected :+61.5 liters			
	from the helicopter, which was confirmed			
	in the investigation			
	Fuel consumption required for the flight :+11.0 liters			
	from the ground to the JPD Kyoto			
	(5 litters for starting engine/run-up + 6			
	minutes of flight time = 6 litters)			
	The amount of refueling at the ground ÷58.0 liters			
	Estimated remaining fuel quantity at the 14.5 liters			
	time of landing at the ground			
	It is probable that the remaining fuel quantity at the time of landing at			
	the ground was estimated to be about 14.5 liters.			
	(2) Estimated quantity of fuel onboard at the time of departure from the Oyabe			
	Helipad			
	130 ^(kt) (^ℓ /h) (^ℓ) (^(ft)			
	120 Estimated onboard fuel: ca. 91 t			
	100 - 8000			
	90 7000			
	80 - 6000			
	70 - 5000			
	60 Estimated onboard fuel 4000			
	$\frac{1}{2}$			
	an ordinary fuel consumption rate of 60.6t/h: ca. 87 t			
	20 2000			
	$10 \qquad \qquad$			
	0 Estimated Ground speed consumption rate(c) MAP (inHg) (kt) Flight altitude (ft) 0			
	16:04 16:12 16:20 16:28 16:36 16:44 16:52 17:00 17:08 17:16 Time			
	Figure 2: The Change of Ground Speed, Flight Altitude and Consumed Fuel of JA7981			
	The change of consumed fuel corresponding to the output calculated by the			
	manufacturer of the helicopter was created into a graph, based on the			
	estimated remaining fuel quantity, the helicopter weight, the wind direction			
	and velocity, the outside air temperature, the flight altitude, the air speed and			
	utilized power output at the time of landing at the ground.			
	It is probable that the fuel consumption rate had come to become			
	particularly higher until around 16:20 because the helicopter, as shown in			
	Figure 2, took off from the Oyabe Helipad and then climbed at a high power			
	(about 22.5 inHg) and flew at a ground speed of 100 kt or more; and			
	furthermore, after 16:44, the fuel consumption was larger than usual because			
	the helicopter kept flying at a high power and increased the speed even when			

starting descending. In addition, it is somewhat likely that its flight against headwind increased the fuel consumption. The remaining fuel quantity of the helicopter at the time of landing at the ground was about 14.5 liters. It is probable that with the consumed fuel that was accumulated during the flight added to this 14.5 liters, the estimated quantity of fuel onboard at the time of take-off was about 91 liters; additionally, the estimated quantity of onboard fuel, if calculated at an ordinary fuel consumption rate, was about 87 liters. (3) Minimum required quantity of onboard fuel in the flight plan for the helicopter

Referring to the Company's Robinson R 44 Series Aircraft Operation Manual, it is probable that minimum required quantity of onboard fuel in the flight plan for the helicopter was 108 liters and the details are as follows;

- a. Starting engine / Run-up : 5 liters
- b. Cruise (Tour distance 121 nm; Maximum knot indicate airspeed 100 KIAS [109 KTAS]; Cruising altitude 6,500 ft [in consideration of the geographical features]; Outside air temperature 16°C; Wind direction 190° Wind velocity 10 kt); Elapsed time one hour 17 minutes :73 liters
- c. Climb compensation (2 liters / 1,000 ft) : 13 liters
- d. Delay compensation (10 % of elapsed time) : 7 liters
- e. Reserve fuel (10 minutes of flight time) : 10 liters

(4) Judgments taken by the pilot

a. Recognition on the quantity of fuel onboard

The pilot informed that in his flight plan, the required flight time would be one hour and 50 minutes and the fuel onboard, 110 liters, but it is probable that the actual onboard fuel quantity, which was estimated from the accumulated fuel quantity that had been consumed in previous flights, was about 87 to 91 liters and not the same as that in the flight plan. It is highly probable that the pilot did not fully grasp the quantity of fuel onboard before departure because he did not fully confirm the quantity of fuel onboard at that time either visually or with the fuel gages before departure in this flight, even though he had consumed some onboard fuel during other flights up to this flight after refueling the helicopter. b. Recognition on the consumed fuel amount

It is probable that the pilot did not continuously monitor the quantity of remaining fuel even though the helicopter consumed higher amount of power after climbing and its consumed fuel amount increased because he assumed that the consumed fuel amount during the flight was uniformly 60 liters per hour, not taking into sufficient consideration the changes in flight conditions. In addition, it was not until LOW FUEL warning light came on that the pilot judged the flight to the JPD Kyoto to be impossible; but it is probable that the pilot could have chosen the appropriate landing site much earlier stage prior to the LOW FUEL warning light ON if he had continuously checked the fuel gages during the flight in accordance with the safety notice stating that "Always land to refuel before the main tank fuel

gage reads less than 1/4 full." (5) Flight plan confirmation made by operation controller The pilot submitted his flight plan to the Civil Aviation Bureau via the headquarters, but the operation controller at the headquarters did not acknowledge that the pilot had refueled the helicopter on the previous day, but had not refueled before departure on the day of the serious incident occurrence. (6) Measures to prevent recurrence of the similar serious incidents a. Preparation and submission of elaborate and accurate flight plan It is necessary to make a flight plan that states the required quantity of fuel onboard after calculating elapsed time corresponding to the cruising altitude and cruising speed by taking into account weather conditions on the flight day. Furthermore, it is also required that the quantity of fuel onboard in a flight plan should indicate the required flight time and be stated accurately because it is concerned with judgments on search and rescue operations. b. Confirmation of the quantity of fuel onboard before departure The pilot must read the values on fuel gages as accurately as possible and confirm visually the fuel level in the tanks.

4. PROBABLE CAUSES

It is highly probable that this serious incident occurred because the helicopter took off without carrying the sufficient onboard fuel, as reported in its flight plan, to reach the destination and the pilot did not continuously monitor the fuel gages during the flight, which resulted in an emergency landing due to insufficient quantity of remaining fuel.

It is also highly probable that the helicopter did not carry the onboard fuel as reported in the flight plan because the pilot did not fully confirm the quantity of fuel onboard at that time before its departure, even though he had consumed some onboard fuel during other flights up to this flight after refueling the helicopter.

5. SAFETY ACTIONS

The Company has taken the following measures to prevent recurrence.

- (1) The Company provided the pilot with re-education on the basic rules including the pre-flight checks.
- (2) The Company thoroughly made the following matters known to all flight crew.
 - a. Understand the characteristics of fuel gages so that they can grasp the quantity of remaining fuel without fail by taking into consideration the accumulated fuel consumption that had been consumed in previous flights. Especially be sure to confirm the quantity of fuel onboard in accordance with the safety notice.
 - b. Be sure to create a flight plan that includes accurate fuel calculations.
 - c. Carry out the pre-flight checks with sufficient margin to ensure confirmation before departure.