AA2017-6

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

PRIVATELY OWNED J A 5 0 K M

September 28, 2017



The objective of the investigation conducted by the Japan Transport Safety Board in accordance with the Act for Establishment of the Japan Transport Safety Board and with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation is to determine the causes of an accident and damage incidental to such an accident, thereby preventing future accidents and reducing damage. It is not the purpose of the investigation to apportion blame or liability.

Kazuhiro Nakahashi Chairman Japan Transport Safety Board

Note:

This report is a translation of the Japanese original investigation report. The text in Japanese shall prevail in the interpretation of the report.

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

CRASH

PRIVATELY OWNED PZL-BIELSKO SZD-50-3 PUCHACZ (GLIDER, TWO-SEATER), JA50KM SAKAE-TOWN, INBA-GUN, CHIBA PREFECTURE AT ABOUT 12:20 JST, MARCH 17, 2016

		August 28, 2017
Adopted by	the Japan	Transport Safety Board
	Chairman	Kazuhiro Nakahashi
	Member	Toru Miyashita
	Member	Toshiyuki Ishikawa
	Member	Yuichi Marui
	Member	Keiji Tanaka
	Member	Miwa Nakanishi

1. PROCESS AND PROGRESS OF THE INVESTIGATION

1.1 Summary of the	On Thursday, March 17, 2016, a privately owned PZL-Bielsko SZD-50-	
Accident	3 Puchacz, registered JA50KM, launched from the Otone airfield for a	
	flight training by aero-tow. It crashed on two houses in a residential area	
	in Sakae-town, Inba-gun, Chiba prefecture and was destroyed and both of	
	an instructor and a trainee on board died.	
1.2 Outline of	Japan Transport Safety Board designated an investigator-in-charge	
the Accident	and an investigator to investigate this accident on March 17, 2016. An	
Investigation	accredited representative of the Republic of Poland, as the State of Design	
	and Manufacture of the aircraft involved in this accident, participated in	
	the investigation.	
	Comments were not invited from the parties relevant to the cause of	
	the accident, because the persons on board died in this accident. Comments	
	on the draft Final Report were invited from the relevant State.	

2. FACTUAL INFORMATION

2.1 History of	According to the statements of witnesses and people concerned with
the Flight	the flying club where the persons on board were member, the history of
	flight was summarized below:
	At about 12:05 Japan Standard Time (JST, UTC+9hrs, unless
	otherwise stated all time are indicated in JST based on a 24-hour clock) on
	March 17, 2016, the privately owned PZL-Bielsko SZD-50-3 Puchacz,
	registered JA50KM (hereinafter referred to as the Glider), launched by
	aero-tow for a flight training to obtain a private pilot certificate for glider
	from runway 07 of the Otone airfield (hereinafter referred to as the

Airfield) in Kawachi Town, Inashiki-gun, Ibaraki prefecture, with the trainee on the front seat and the instructor (captain) on the rear seat. The accident flight was the second one of the day for the instructor and the trainee, and the first flight of the day was the first one by the type of glider for the trainee. The instructor had flown with another member of the flying club in-between these two flights.

The Glider left from the tow plane at the western sky of the Airfield at an altitude of about 3,000 ft.

The pilot who took off from the Airfield following the Glider at 12:06, watched it flying at an altitude of about 1,500 ft between Wakakusa-Ohashi bridge and the Airfield during his flying toward the right base leg of the runway 07 in order to land at the Airfield. After that, the pilot saw that the Glider was flying toward Ajikidai at the south of the Airfield, when his aircraft was almost at the final leg of the runway 07.

According to a member of the flying club (hereinafter referred to as the Club), the sky around the accident site was one of flight routes to enter the south side of a traffic pattern of the Airfield. The sky of the residential area tends to generate thermals, the member sometimes use it to glide.




Figure 1. Estimated Flight Route

A witness A who was at about 600 m south of the accident site saw that the Glider was flying in a posture that the nose was so low while rotating on its fuselage, but he could not see the following scene, because a wood hid the Glider from his eyes.

A witness B who was at about 400 m north of the accident site saw that the Glider was diving while showing its wings surface, but she did not remember whether it was rotating or not. She could not see the final scene

	because a wood hid the Glider from her eyes.		
	The accident occurred at around 12:20 on March 17, 2016, in Sakae		
	Town, Inba-gun, Chiba prefecture (35°50'35"N, 1		
2.2 Injuries to	(1) The instructor and the trainee died.		
Persons	(2) No resident was injured.		
2.3 Damage to	Extent of Damage: Destroyed		
Aircraft	Aft Fuselage: Rupture		
Anciali			
	• Forward Fuselage: A part below the front seat of the cockpit was seriously damaged and the front seat fell out.		
	 Both wings: Rupture 		
	Extent of Damage to the residential properties		
		magad	
2.4 Personnel		nagea.	
	(1) Instructor Male, Age 69	A	
Information	Commercial pilot certificate (glider)	August 15, 2014	
	Type rating for high class glider	August 15, 2014	
	Flight instructor certificate (glider)	August 15, 2014	
	Class 1 aviation medical certificate	Validity: May 26, 2016	
	Pilot Competency Assessment		
	Expiration date of piloting capable period	March 9, 2018	
	Total flight time	229 hours 30 minutes	
		(626 launches)	
	Flight time in the last 30 days	1 hour 16 minutes	
		(6 launches)	
	Total flight time on the type of glider	36 hours 34 minutes	
		(92 launches)	
	Flight time in the last 30 days	0 hours 38 minutes	
		(2 launches)	
	Latest flight on the type of glider	November $27, 2014$	
	(2) Trainee Male, Age 66		
	Private pilot certificate (Airplane)	November 7, 1972	
	Class 2 aviation medical certificate	Validity: January 7, 2017	
	Total flight time (glider)	1 hour 54 minutes	
		(4 launches)	
	Flight time in the last 30 days	0 hours 23 minutes	
		(1 launch)	
	Total flight time on the type of glider	0 hours 23 minutes	
		(1 launch)	
2.5 Glider	Type of the Glider: PZL-Bielsko SZD-50-3 Pucha	acz	
Information		lanufacture: June 16, 1983	
	Certificate of Airworthiness: No.2016-33-01,	Validity: January 5, 2017	
	Category of Airworthiness: Glider Utility U		
	Total flight time	2,375 hours 29 minutes	
	When the accident occurred, the weight an		

	of gravity of th	e Glider were e	estimated to h	ave been within	the allowable
	range.				
2.6 Meteorological	According to the persons involved in the Club, the weather around				
Information	the Airfield wa	s sunny and go	od condition.		
				ing to the time	of the accident
	Wind direction and velocity corresponding to the time of the accident observed at Ryugasaki Automated Meteorological Data Acquisition				
	System, Japan Meteorological Agency located about 4 km north-northwest				
	of the Airfield were as follows;				
		Average Maximum Wind			m Wind
	Time	Wind	Wind	Wind	Wind
	1 mic	Direction	Velocity	Direction	Velocity
	12:00	ENE	2.4 m/s	ENE	4.3 m/s
	12:10	ESE	2.2 m/s	E	3.9 m/s
	12:20	Е	2.4 m/s	Е	4.1m/s
	12:30	Е	2.5 m/s	ENE	4.1 m/s
2.7 Permission	The perm	uission for Pilot	Training Flig	hts and others	were obtained
under Civil	The permission for Pilot Training Flights and others were obtained, under the proviso of paragraph (1), Article 92, Civil Aeronautics Act (Act				
Aeronautics Act	No. 231 of 1952)				
2.8 Additional		on on the accide	ent site		
Information		accident site is			
mormanon	residential area of Sakae-town				
	Inba-gun, Chiba Prefecture, and is located at south of the Airfield on the opposite bank across the Tone River. Because an air space is restricted by Narita Positive			Power Line	
				Height:10.5m	
				Road width 5.7m	
		of the Airfield,			
		raining for glid		r : TV Antenna	↓ →
	- 0	8 8		Damaged ar	rea
	-	rried out on the west of it and		of houses	3
			·	Figure 2. Acc	ident Site
		residential area		CC	A. C. 11 C.
	_		south side tra	ffic pattern of tl	he Airfield from
		and southwest.			
				uses lined from	
				tabilizer and ve	
				n roof of the fin	
				of its second flo	
		_	north to nort	hwest on its f	irst floor were
	partially d	amaged.			

 $^{^{*1}}$ "Positive Control Area" means an airspace designated in the Paragraph 1 of Article 94-2 of the CAA by the Notification by the MLIT. No person may operate an aircraft in VFR within the airspace unless otherwise authorized by ATC.

The right wing was found at scattering from the site of the southern house to the south of the site of the northern house. A part of the south side roof and the veranda on the second floor of the northern house were damaged (See Photo 1). The broken pieces of the Glider remained on those two houses and a narrow area between them.

(2) Damage on the Glider

The left main wing of the Glider was broken at about 5.8 m from the wingtip, and the right main wing was bent upward near the outside of the airbrake^{*2}. In addition, both airbrakes were extended.



Photo1. Accident Site (View from the west)

About the cockpit, the lower part of the front seat was seriously damaged and the canopy was opened and damaged. Besides, the instruments for the rear seat, which were integrated with the canopy, were separated from the canopy and were found at south of the site at the northern house.

The trainee who was sitting in the front seat was found in the south side property of the northern house. The instructor who was sitting in the rear seat was found there wearing the safety belts and a part of the buckles was broken.



Photo 2. Aft fuselage

Parts of the aft fuselage including the horizontal and vertical stabilizer were broken at a point about 6.7m from the nose, and found on the northeast roof of the first floor of the southern house.

In addition, the recovered airspeed indicator for the front seat was indicating zero, the recovered altimeter for the front seat was indicating a close altitude to the elevation of the accident site. Indications of the rear seat airspeed indicator and altimeter were different from the ones at the front seat, however, as a result of the teardown investigation, the indication on the rear seat airspeed indicator was the position to indicate zero, and the inside of the rear seat altimeter was damaged by the shock to forward.

(3) Information on Emergency Call

According to the Chiba Prefectural Police Headquarters, an emergency call was made by a neighboring resident at 12:23.

(4) Medical Information

According to the Chiba Prefectural Police Headquarters, the death of the persons on board were caused by the impact at the time of crash.

^{*2} "Airbrake" is to adjust the speed or angel of descending an aircraft by extending the board to cause a resistance to air on wings.

(5) Information on Maintenance of the Glider
The Glider was submerged when parking at the Airfield because
of the rising water from the Tone River by heavy rain in September,
2015. Therefore, the Glider was repaired in accordance with the repair
manual issued by the manufacturer (Repair manual of SZD-50-3
PUCHACZ glass-fiber glider) and others from October of the same year
to January, 2016, and passed an inspection for certificate of
airworthiness in January, 2016.
The pilot who saw the Glider during his flight had witnessed the
instructor performing a pre-flight inspection. In addition, even if the
two flights carried out before the accident, no abnormality of the Glider
was reported to the mechanics and others, and there was no radio call
to notify any abnormality from the Glider during the flight.
(6) Records of Flight
There were no data of the flight recorded by GPS equipment and
others.
(7) Performance and Emergency Procedure on the Glider
The Aircraft Flight Manual of the Glider has the following
descriptions.(Excerpt)
① Minimum Sink Rate/Airspeed : Airspeed 74 km/h 138 ft/min
2 Depending on the total weight of the glider, the stalling speed
in the straight flight is of about 57 km/h for a solo lightweight pilot,
and about 64 km/h for two pilots with the weight close to the
maximum take-off weight.
③ Recovery from Spin
(1) Use full rudder deflection opposite to the rotation.
(2) Wait for about 1 second.
(3) Push the stick forward a little beyond its neutral
position.
(4) Return the rudder to neutral and gently pull
the stick after rotation ceases.
Use of the aileron in the direction of rotation is not preferable
because it has the effect of further increasing the rotation. Keep
aileron neutral.
(8) Stall Speed during Turn
In the case where the stall speed during level flight is Vs and the
stall speed during turn is V, V varies corresponding to the bank angle
as follows.
$V = V s \sqrt{n}$ (n : Load Factor during Turn.)
$n = 1 / \cos \theta$ (θ : Bank Angle)
(9) Information on Spin
In the "Glider Flying Handbook" issued by FAA ^{*3} , there is the
following description about spin. (Excerpt)

 $^{^{\}ast 3}\,$ "FAA" is an abbreviation of Federal Aviation Administration.

The cause of a spin is stalled airflow over one wing before airflow
stalling over the other wing. This is a result of uncoordinated flight with
unequal airflows over the wings.
Spins occur in uncoordinated slow flight and high rate turns
(overbanking for airspeed). The lack of coordination is normally caused
by too much or not enough rudder control for the amount of aileron
being used. (Omission)
Glider pilots should always be aware of the type of wing forms on
their aircraft and the stall characteristics of that wing in various
maneuvers.
(10) Flight inside Thermal
In the "Glider Flying Handbook" issued by FAA, there is the
following description about the flight inside a thermal. (Excerpt)
Inside a Thermal
Bank Angle
Optimum climb is achieved when proper bank angle and speed are
used after entering a thermal. The shallowest possible bank angle at
minimum sink speed is ideal. Thermal size and associated turbulence
usually do not allow this. (Omission) Thermals tend to be smaller at
lower levels and expand in size as they rise higher. Therefore, a steeper
bank angle is required at lower altitudes, and shallower bank angles
can often be used while climbing higher.
Speed
If turbulence is light and the thermal is well formed, use the
minimum sink speed for the given bank angle. This should optimize
the climb because the glider's sink rate is at its lowest, and the turn
radius is smaller.(Omission)
There are two other reasons to avoid thermaling speeds that are
too slow: the risk of a stall and lack of controllability. (Omission)
Depending on the stall characteristics of the particular glider or
in turbulent thermals, a spin entry is always possible. Glider pilots
should carefully monitor speed and nose attitude at lower altitudes.
(11) Trial of Flight Characteristics of the Same Type of Glider in the UK
In the accident report (AAIB bulletin No: 1/2005) issued by
AAIB ^{*4} , as a result of the flight trial conducted by BGA ^{*5} on the same
type of glider, there are statements about the points to be paid
attention to the stall characteristics during a turn and the height loss
at the time of recovery from a spin.

 $^{^{\}ast 4}$ "AAIB" is an abbreviation of Air Accident investigation Branch which means the aviation accident investigating agent in UK.

^{*5} "BGA" is abbreviation of British Gliding Association which is the governing body for gliding in the UK.

3. ANALYSIS

3.1 Involvement	None
of Weather	None
3.2 Involvement	Unknown
of Pilot	UIKIIOWII
3.3 Involvement	Unknown
of Equipment	UIKIIOWII
3.4 Analysis of	(1) Identify the Pilot Flying
Findings	 (1) Identify the Flot Flying It was not possible to determine who piloted the flight at the time of accident because the both persons on board died. (2) Qualification of Persons on Board
	 (2) Qualification of Fersons on Doard Both persons on board had valid aviation medical certificates and the instructor had a valid airman competence certificate. (3) Situation of the Glider
	The Glider had a valid certificate of airworthiness. Furthermore, no abnormality was reported to the mechanics and others at the pre- flight inspection on the day and during the previous two flights prior to the accident, therefore it is probable that the Glider had no abnormality. However, because of the deaths of the two persons on board and the severe damages to the Glider, it is not possible to determine the presence or the absence of its abnormality right before the crash.
	 (4) Situation on Airbrakes Both airbrakes of the Glider were extended, however, it is not possible to determine when they were extended since the system to control them had received severe damages at the crash.
	(5) ThermalIt is somewhat likely that a thermal was existing locally at the time of the accident because the temperature is apt to rise due to solar radiation since the area around the accident site is a densely populated residential area.
	 (6) Situation on the Flight It is probable that the Glider was flying in the direction of the accident site from west of the Airfield at an altitude of about 1,500 ft, however, it is not possible to determine the detailed situation on the flight of the Glider at the time of the accident. (7) Situation on the Glider at the Time of the Crash There was no crash damaged trace at the southern house other
	than the northwest part of the second floor where received the crash of the left wing of the Glider and the northwest part of the first floor where received the crash of the nose, no damages on the antenna mounted on the east roof on the second floor of the house and no damages onto the utility pole and power line installed near the east boundary of those properties of two houses, therefore it is probable that the Glider was banked to left and crashed with the posture that the nose was so low.

(8) Spin
It is probable that the Glider crashed because it had entered a spin
and could not recover from the spin, since it was flying while rotating
with the posture that the nose was so low.
Regarding why the Glider entered a spin, it is probable there are
following possibilities, however, it is not possible to determine the cause,
because the persons on board died;
① Stalled and entered a spin during a turn in a thermal;
As described in $2.8(10)$, since the range of thermal tends to be
small at low altitude, a glider should stay within the range where
the glider could efficiently utilize the thermal and in order to
minimize a sink rate, it is effective for a pilot to fly at Minimum
Sink Airspeed with consideration of a load due to a bank angle as
well as a stall speed. The Minimum Sink Airspeed and the stall
speed with two pilots with the weight close to the maximum takeoff
weight at the time of straight flight of the Glider were respectively
74 km/h and 64 km/h. When the 45 degree bank angel is required,
the Minimum Sink Airspeed and the stall speed were respectively
88 km/h and 76 km/h. It is probable that the Minimum Sink
Airspeed during a turn was not sufficient margin against the stall
speed for a pilot who is required to keep the speed and bank angle,
at same time to deal with the change of wind and air current
turbulence and to monitor the outside and others.
During a turn at low altitude where there was not enough
height margin to recover from a spin or stall, it is probable that a
pilot is required to pay attention to a relationship between bank
angle and airspeed.
2 The Glider was entered a spin accidentally during turn to
manage the altitude in order to land at the Airfield.
(9) Recovery from Spin
Regarding why the Glider could not recover from a spin, it is
somewhat likely that there are following possibilities, however, it is not
possible to determine the cause, because the persons on board died.
a) The recovery operation was not appropriate since it was the
second training flight for the trainee and the instructor had not
flown the Glider for more than one year.
b) The recovery operation was executed, but the height loss was
too large against the flight altitude.

4. PROBABLE CAUSES

In this accident, it is probable that the Glider was crashed because it had entered a spin and could not recover from it.

Regarding why the Glider entered the spin and could not recover from it, it is not possible to determine the cause because the persons on board died.

5. SAFETY ACTION

The Club took the following actions after the accident;

(1) The Club implemented the safety seminar and confirmation of the competency to the members (including the contents regarding the piloting training), and at the same time, the lecture regarding how to use the Airfield to the concerned parties using it other than the members.

(2) The Club prohibited gliders from flying over the densely populated residential area, in addition to powered aircraft (small airplane and motor glider).