AA2015-7

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

PRIVATELY OWNED JA111L

July 30, 2015



The objective of the investigation conducted by the Japan Transport Safety Board in accordance with the Act for Establishment of the Japan Transport Safety Board and with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation is to determine the causes of an accident and damage incidental to such an accident, thereby preventing future accidents and reducing damage. It is not the purpose of the investigation to apportion blame or liability.

> Norihiro Goto Chairman, Japan Transport Safety Board

Note:

This report is a translation of the Japanese original investigation report. The text in Japanese shall prevail in the interpretation of the report.

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

DAMAGED TO AIRCRAFT DURING FORCED LANDING PRIVATELY OWNED EXTRA EA300/L, JA111L NAKANOCHINAI, IIZAKA-CHO,FUKUSHIMA CITY, FUKUSHIMA PREFECTURE, JAPAN AROUND 10:16 JST, MAY 12, 2014

June 19, 2015 Adopted by the Japan Transport Safety Board Chairman Norihiro Goto Member Shinsuke Endoh Member Toshiyuki Ishikawa Member Sadao Tamura Member Yuki Shuto

Keiji Tanaka

1 PROCESS AND PROGRESS OF THE INVESTIGATION

On May 12, 2014, the Japan Transport Safety Board designated an investigator-in-charge and an investigator to investigate this accident. An accredited representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, as the State of Design and Manufacture of the aircraft, participated in this investigation.

Member

Comments were invited from parties relevant to the cause of the accident. Comments on the draft report were invited from the relevant State.

2 FACTUAL INFORMATION

2.1	History of the	According to the statements of the captain, another pilot on board
	Flight	(hereinafter referred to as "the pilot") and the witness, the history of the
		flight is summarized below:
		On May 12 (Monday), 2014 at around 09:42 JST(Japan Standard
		Time:UTC+9 hours), a privately owned Extra EA300/L, registered JA111L,
		with a center tank and an acro tank(refer to2.7(6)) having been fully fueled,
		took off from Fukushima Sky Park Temporary Air Field (hereinafter
		referred to as" the Sky Park") for familiarization flight with the captain
		sitting in the rear seat* and piloting the aircraft, and the pilot sitting in the




Figure1: Estimated Flight Route

front seat. While climbing, the pilot took over the piloting from the captain.

After checking the condition of the aircraft including inverted flight in the western airspace of the Sky Park, the pilot performed a series of acrobatic maneuvers called "sequence" at approximately 1,500~4,500 ft Above Field Level (hereinafter referred to as "AFL") of the Sky Park.

Thereafter, taking over the piloting from the pilot, the captain performed the same sequence. Having finished the sequence, the captain and the pilot decided that they could perform the sequence one more time based on the elapsed time, thus taking over the piloting from the captain again, the pilot performed the third sequence of the day. There were no strange sound or foul smell and the engine was working normally during the flight.

After completing the sequence, the pilot closed the throttle and headed for the Sky Park while descending. (refer to Figure 1)

Having passed over the Sky Park at approximately 3,000 ft AFL, the aircraft flew to north-north-east while descending. Thereafter, it turned right and headed for the downwind leg of the runway 14.

The pilot handed over the piloting to the captain when the aircraft approached the downwind leg at approximately 1,200 ft AFL.

The captain opened the throttle to increase engine power for level flight at the downwind leg, but the engine didn't respond.

The captain checked the position of mixture lever, master switch and ignition switch then he repeated opening/closing of the throttle several times but the engine power didn't increase. The captain didn't check the fuel quantity indicator at that time.

Because the captain considered that he wouldn't be able to reach the

		Sky Park in that situation, he decided to make	
		orchard which he found by chance in the moun	
		At around 10:15, the captain reported	to FUKUSHIMA FLIGHT
		SERVICE that they were in a situation of emer	rgency.
		The aircraft flew to the peach orcha	rd while turning left and
		approached there almost wing level altitude a	at approximately 3 m above
		ground level. Having the middle of its left wing	g collide against an iron pole
		which stood at the border of a peach orchard a	nd a bamboo grass field, the
		aircraft made forced landing on a bamboo g	cass field and came to stop
		upside down at around 10:16.	
		After the aircraft came to stop, the captai	
		the cockpit. When the pilot escaped, his	
		something like smoke oil for acrobatic flight,	but both of the captain and
		the pilot did not notice fuel smell. Both of the	m didn't touch the switches
		when they escaped from the aircraft. There was	as no outbreak of fire.
		The captain and the pilot stated that	propeller was rotating just
		before forced landing and the witness who wa	s at his peach orchard near
		the accident site stated that he heard the weak	er engine sound than usual.
2.2	Injuries to the	Captain: slightly injured	
	Persons	Pilot : seriously injured	
2.3	Damage to the	Extent of damage: Destroyed	
	Aircraft	①The left wing was separated from	
		the fuselage at its root and it was	ONITANT
		crushed under the fuselage.	
		The left aileron was fallen in the	
		peach orchard.	
		^② The engine was detached from its	
		mount and it was in front of the	Accident Aircraft
		aircraft. No anomalies were found in the spa	rk plugs and the fuel filter.
		³ All the three blades of the propeller were fra	ctured at their shank.
		\oplus The center tank was partly collapsed and c	cacked but no damage was
		found in the acro tank.	
2.4	Personnel	(1) Captain Male, Age 26	
	Information	Private pilot certificate (Airplane)	December 25, 2008
		Type rating for Single-engine Land	December 25, 2008
		Class 2 Aviation Medical Certificate	Validity : June 30, 2017
			valuaty \cdot sume 50, 2017
1		Total flight time	357 hours 16 minutes
1			
		Total flight time	357 hours 16 minutes
		Total flight time Total flight time on the type of aircraft	357 hours 16 minutes
		Total flight time Total flight time on the type of aircraft (2) Pilot Male, Age 46	357 hours 16 minutes 8 hours 03 minutes
		Total flight time Total flight time on the type of aircraft (2) Pilot Male, Age 46 Private pilot certificate (Airplane)	357 hours 16 minutes 8 hours 03 minutes May 29, 1998
		Total flight time Total flight time on the type of aircraft (2) Pilot Male, Age 46 Private pilot certificate (Airplane) Type rating for Single-engine Land	357 hours 16 minutes 8 hours 03 minutes May 29, 1998 May 29, 1998

2.5	Aircraft	(1) Aircraft Type : Extra EA300/L	
	Information	Serial number : 1193, Date of manu	facture : January 7, 2005
		Certificate of airworthiness : No. TO-25-183	3 ,Validity : July 11, 2014
		Category of airworthiness :	Airplane, Acrobat A
		Total flight time :	522 hours 23 minutes
		Glide ratio :	1: 6.2
		(2) Engine Type : Lycoming AEIO-540-L1B5	
		Serial number : L-29870-48A,	
		Date of manufacture :	September 20, 2004
		Total time in service :	522 hours 23 minutes
			Units : m
		8.00	
		6.96	
		Figure 2: Three Angle View of Extra	EA300/L
2.6	Meteorological	The observed meteorological data of the S	
2.0	Information	09:00 Wind direction 120°; Wind velocity 6 kt (-
	mormation	more; fine weather	
		10:00 Wind direction 120°; Wind velocity 16 kt	(8 m/s); Visibility 10 km or
		more; fine weather	
2.7	Additional	(1) Preflight Briefing	
	Information	The captain and the pilot made a prefli	ght briefing concerning the
		process of the sequence but they didn't make	
		the flight time. The captain and the pilot ha	d flown together five times
		before the accident and performed the indi	vidual acrobatic maneuver
		but that day was the first time for them	to perform the sequence
		together.	
		(2) Endurance	
		The captain had calculated the fuel co	nsumption rate by himself
		based on the Pilot's Operating Handboo	ok and he estimated the
		endurance for a center tank and an acro tank	
		33 minutes (30 minutes for from takeoff to e	
		minutes for return back to the Sky Park) but	-
		was sufficient time to fly because he or the	
		the maximum power during the acrobatic fl calculated the fuel consumption rate of each t	

consumption results.

The pilot estimated the endurance for the flight from takeoff to landing was approximately 35 minutes based on his experience.

According to the Pilot's Operating Handbook, the endurance for the full tank (a center tank and an acro tank) is supposed as follows: Approximately 30 minutes with maximum power, approximately 35 minutes with 75% Power, approximately 48 minutes with 65% Power. (3) Management of fuel and flight time

As the fuel quantity indicator doesn't indicate accurately during the acrobatic flight, the captain didn't have a habit of checking the fuel quantity indicator thus he managed the remaining fuel and flight time with a stopwatch. In addition, as the fuel quantity indicator is only mounted on the rear instrument panel, no one but the captain was able to check the remaining fuel.

- (4) Description of the Pilot's operating Handbook concerning the fuel Pilot's Operating Handbook Section 2 Limitations (excerpt) 2.14.2 OPERATING PLACARDS (on the rear instrument panel under fuel capacity indicator) WING TANK MUST BE EMPTY FOR ACROBATICS ACRO & CENTER TANK SHOWS "ZERO" IN LEVEL FLIGHT BELOW 11 L(2.9 US GAL) UNUSABLE FUEL 5.5 L(1.5 US GAL) (on the rear instrument panel under the acro & center tank fuel capacity indicator) THE REMAINING FUEL IN LEVEL FLIGHT CANNOT BE USED SAFELY WHEN INDICATOR READS "ZERO"
- (5) Description of the Pilot's Operating Handbook concerning the cruising range and the duration
 Pilot's Operating Handbook Section 5 Performance (account)

Pilot's Operating Handbook Section 5 Performance(excerpt) 5.1 GENERAL

Some indeterminate variables such as engine and propeller, air turbulence and others may account for variations as high as 10% or more in range and endurance. Therefore, it is important to utilize all available information to estimate the fuel required for the particular flight.

(6) Fuel tank

The fuel tanks of the aircraft consist of two wing tanks (60 L×2) located one in each wing, a center tank (42 L) and an acro tank (9 L) in front of the front seat .




Figure 3: Fuel Tank

The center tank and the acro tank are connected directly and the fuel is provided to the engine through the acro tank.

(7) Remaining fuel

No fuel was observed in the center tank and only approximately 10 ml of fuel was observed in the acro tank.

No trace of fuel leakage was observed around the aircraft.

	(8) Fuel pump and fuel injector
	Functional tests of the fuel pump (engine driven) and the fuel
	injector were conducted by the manufacturer in the U.S.A, but no
	anormalies were found in both of them.
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* The Airplane is equipped with main flight instruments and switches such as fuel quantity indicator, magnetic compass, fuel flow indicator, in the rear instrument panel, thus the captain sits the rear seat when two pilots are on board. The front flight instrument panel is also equipped with flight instruments such as a speed meter and an altimeter thus the piloting is also available in the front seat. Minimum number of crew is one in the rear seat.

3 ANALYSIS

3.1	Involvement of Weather	No
3.2	Involvement of Pilots	Yes
3.3	Involvement of Aircraft	No
3.4	Analysis of Findings	(1) Engine The engine fuel pump (engine driven), fuel injector, the spark plugs
	T munigs	and fuel filter showed no anomalies. According to the statements, the captain and the pilot mentioned that the engine was working normally and the witness also mentioned that the engine sound had been heard. Therefore, it is highly probable that there were no anormalies in the engine.
		 (2) Remaining fuel It is highly probable that the aircraft consumed more fuel than that of the captain and the pilot estimated during the three times of sequences. Since the flight time elapsed more than 30 minutes after takeoff and very little remaining fuel was detected from the acro tank, it is also highly probable that the fuel quantity indicator had read "zero" when the aircraft entered the downwind leg. As described in 2.7(4), the remaining fuel in level flight cannot be used safely when indicator reads "zero", it is highly probable that the fuel was almost exhausted at that time, thus the aircraft couldn't get the sufficient engine power to return back to the Sky Park. (3) Endurance and the fuel consumption rate
		The captain estimated endurance at approximately 33 minutes but he had perceived that there was sufficient time to fly because he or the pilot wouldn't always use the maximum power during the acrobatic flight. On the other hand, the pilot estimated endurance at 35 minutes based on his experience. Although it was the first time for them to perform the sequence, it is probable that both of them didn't grasp the fuel consumption rate based on the past fuel consumption results appropriately. The captain hadn't been checking the fuel quantity indicator during the flight to the Sky Park after the pilot finished the

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	acrobatic flight where the fuel quantity indicator didn't indicate
	accurately.
	Therefore, it is highly probable that both of them continued flying
	without apprehension about fuel exhaustion in spite of that they had
	flown more than 30 minutes after takeoff.
	As described in 2.7(5), it is described in the Pilot's Operating
	Handbook that "Some indeterminate variables may account for
	variations as high as 10% or more in range and endurance."
	Thus, the captain should have estimated the endurance using all
	the available effective information and made the flight plan with
	sufficient time at least more than 10% of endurance, much more when
	challenging the new acrobatic maneuver. He should have confirmed
	the remaining fuel by checking the fuel quantity indicator and landed
	earlier to the Sky Park before the fuel quantity indicator read "ZERO"
(4) Damage to the Aircraft
	It is highly probable that the aircraft was damaged while
	the aircraft made a forced landing on a bamboo grass field,
	after collided its left wing against the iron pole which stood at
	the border of a peach orchard and a bamboo grass field.
	(5) Possibility of gliding back to the Sky Park
	The calculated glide distance based on the aircraft's glide
	ratio"1: 6.2" and the altitude at the downwind leg (approximately
	1,200 ft (360 m) AFL is approximately 2.2 km.
	Therefore, it is highly probable that it was difficult for the aircraft to return back to the Sky Park with gliding even though it took the shortest course from the downwind leg to the Sky Park (approximately 2.8 km).

4 PROBABLE CAUSES

It is highly probable that this accident was occurred because the aircraft consumed more fuel than the expectation of the captain and the pilot during the sequence thus the aircraft's fuel was almost exhausted when it entered the downwind leg, therefore it couldn't get the sufficient engine power to fly to the Sky Park and as a result, the aircraft was damaged during forced landing.

It is probable that the reason of the aircraft consumed more fuel than the expectation and it was almost exhausted was that both of the captain and the pilot didn't grasp the fuel consumption rate based on the past fuel consumption results appropriately and they didn't make the flight plan with sufficient time.