Japan Transport Safety Board

The response from the EASA to the safety recommendation

The Japan Transport Safety Board received the response from the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) to the safety recommendation issued June 28, 2013 as attached regarding an accident of JA6522 (Eurocopter AS350B3) operated by Shikoku Air Service Corporation in Higashikagawa City, Kagawa Prefecture , Japan on September 22, 2011.

JTSB safety recommendation to the EASA

In order to contribute to the prevention of recurrence of similar accidents, based on the result of investigation of the accident, the Japan Transport Safety Board recommends that the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) take the following measures:

(1) Electrical equipment and its wiring in the baggage compartment

In this accident, the wiring connected to the strobe light power supply, installed in the rear hold of the Helicopter where a fire occurred, were not protected in a cage or rigid housing.

The airworthiness standards: FAR 27.855(b) stipulates as follows:

(b) No compartment may contain any controls, wiring, lines, equipment, or

accessories whose damage or failure would affect safe operation, unless those items are protected so that:

(1) They cannot be damaged by the movement of cargo in the compartment; and

(2)Their breakage or failure will not create a fire hazard.

Therefore, the EASA should make it mandatory to modify the rear hold of the Eurocopter AS 350 series so that electrical equipment and its wiring are fully protected.

(2) Manifestation of the matters which must be dealt with immediately by memory among the emergency procedures

In this accident, when smoke arose in the cabin, the pilot attempted to perform emergency procedures of aircraft, but failed to do so as provided in the Flight Manual because he had not enough time to confirm procedures with the emergency procedures checklist inserted into the knee board and because he did not remember necessary emergency procedures. The Flight Manual did not manifest the emergency procedures that must be dealt with immediately.

Therefore, in the Flight Manual of the Eurocopter AS350 Series, the EASA should urge the designer and manufacturer of the helicopter to specify the memory items among emergency procedures so that they can be performed immediately.

European Aviation Safety Agency

(Name) • Deputy Director for Strategic Safety • Executive Directorate

Cologne, 19. FEB. 2014
JVI/ZOL/RBE/E(2) 2014(D)50784

Japan Transport Safety Board (JTSB)
Dr. Nohiro GOTO
Chairman
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Tokyo 100-8918
Japan

Subject: Safety recommendations related to the event to AEROSPATIALE - AS350 registered JA6522, on 22/09/2011, at Kagawa Prefecture - Japan

Dear Dr. Goto,

Following the Safety Recommendations mentioned above addressed to the European Aviation Safety Agency, please find thereafter the Agency's response.

Yours sincerely,

(Original signed)

Subject: AEROSPATIALE - AS350 registered JA6522, on 22/09/2011, at Kagawa Prefecture - Japan

Reply to Safety Recommendation JAPN-2013-001 received on 10/07/2013

Safety Recommendation:	The EASA should make it mandatory to modify the rear hold of the Eurocopter AS350 series so that electrical equipment and its wiring are fully protected.
Response:	EASA's Emergency Airworthiness Directive 2011-0244-E required, as an interim action, deactivation of the position strobe light system or repetitive inspections of the position strobe light power supply installation and, depending on findings, applicable corrective actions. Eurocopter developed the modification 07 4611 consisting in installing, in the rear cargo compartment, a guard cover for the strobe light power supply unit and wiring of the optional strobe lights installation OP-0811. This modification was approved by the issuance of EASA Major Change 10043337 and validated in Japan by the JCAB Letter reference KOKU-KI-KI-1259. On 27 November 2013 EASA issued the Airworthiness Directive 2013-0281 which supersedes the Airworthiness Directive 2011-0244-E and requires the installation of the protector assembly on the wiring and on the power supply unit of the position strobe light installation, thus providing a terminating action of the repetitive inspections and allowing any deactivated systems to be activated again.
Status:	Closed – Agreement

JVI/ZOL/RBE/E(2) 2014(D)50784